Checkpoint governance in South Sudan
Exploring the role of roadblocks and the collapse of state authority
Joshua Craze, Ferenc Dávid Markó
This paper by Joshua Craze and Ferenc Dávid Markó examines the role of checkpoints in South Sudan’s political economy, challenging the view that they are simply obstacles to trade, humanitarian access and state reform. It argues that checkpoints are a central form of state authority in a country where government salaries and public services are limited, oil revenues have declined and humanitarian funding is increasingly uncertain. The paper shows that rather than representing state failure, checkpoints reflect the longstanding predatory character of state power in South Sudan, with communities themselves sometimes adopting similar systems to resist elite extraction.
This paper is the 16th in a working paper series on Roadblocks and Revenues, a collaboration between the Danish Institute for International Studies, the International Centre for Tax and Development and the Centre on Armed Groups.