Yemen’s war is also fought through roads. This paper shows how checkpoints along the Abyan–Aden–Lahej–al-Dhale’a–Dhamar corridor have become tools for extracting money, sorting people and goods, and enforcing rival claims to authority. It contrasts fragmented checkpoint rule in government/STC areas with the more centralised Houthi system, while showing that both make movement costly and politically controlled.

This discussion paper examines how the international order that once contained armed conflict is fracturing across multiple, simultaneous dimensions. Drawing on cases spanning Sudan, Myanmar, Yemen, the Sahel, and Ukraine, the paper argues that these compounding failures have given armed groups and de facto authorities far greater freedom and resources than most analysts anticipated.

The paper identifies four cross-cutting dynamics reshaping this landscape: the breakdown of the classic patron-proxy model into fragmented, multi-patron brokerage networks; the growing economic and infrastructural power of armed groups, who now govern revenue streams, trade routes, and services independent of external backers; the retreat of international norm enforcement in favour of local, informal bargaining; and the weaponisation of misinformation to derail negotiations and access agreements. On this basis, the paper calls for a fundamental shift in how donors and practitioners approach engagement.

What kind of authority is built at a desert checkpoint? This paper examines how control over movement around Kufrah, in southeastern Libya near the borders with Sudan and Chad, turns checkpoints into institutions of rule, where armed actors tax passage, define legitimate trade, exclude rivals, and shape the logistics of regional war.

How do checkpoints shape online scam economies? This paper examines how control over border crossings, roadblocks, and gateways sustains scam centres in Myanmar’s borderlands and shapes the uneven effects of anti-scam enforcement.

This briefing note shows Myanmar’s conflict entering a critical phase, where resistance forces face growing pressure but continue to adapt, even as the war becomes a prolonged and uncertain contest of endurance.

This  report examines how Myanmar’s anti-coup resistance movement is being financed, offering a comprehensive analysis of how the People’s Defence Forces (PDFs) sustain themselves economically. Drawing on dozens of interviews with resistance actors, civil society, and international stakeholders, it sheds light on the diverse fundraising methods, ranging from crowdfunding to natural resource taxation, and explores how these practices are reshaping local governance, political legitimacy, and the broader trajectory of Myanmar’s war. The report confronts complex dilemmas around accountability, aid diversion, and international support, offering critical practical and operational insights.

The flow of opium presented unique opportunities and challenges for the Burmese armed groups interested in profiting from its concentrated wealth. In this working paper, John Buchanan explores the emerging features of armed group predation tied to the explosive growth of Shan State’s opium sector from the 1950s to the 1990s.

This paper argues that we should not see ‘political’ and ‘criminal’ groups as separate categories. Instead, we should envision a spectrum of motives and practices across all armed groups, regardless of how they are labelled.

Based on a review of armed group taxation practices, this journal article argues that armed group motives go beyond revenue. It explores explanations related to ideology, legitimacy, institution building, control of populations, and the performance of public authority.

Surveying the existing literature, this ICTD Working Paper argues that a deeper understanding of armed group taxation, the motivations behind it, and the implications it has for an armed group’s relationship with civilian and diaspora populations, as well as the broader international community.