Shifting Sands: The Axis of Resistance after the War in Gaza
The war in Gaza has had deep implications for power dynamics in the Middle East. Iran’s regional power has been particularly impacted with an altering of the so-called ‘Axis of Resistance’, its network of allies across the region – including in Gaza, Lebanon, Iraq, Syria, and Yemen. This has had a considerable impact on Iran’s military capabilities in the current confrontation with Israel. To shed light on these developments, and what they mean for Iran and the balance of power in the region, we spoke with Dr. Fatima Moussaoui, a Middle East expert, fellow at the Centre on Armed Groups, and lecturer at Sciences Po Paris, who explores these dynamics in her upcoming book, Iran’s Military Power Projection and the Empowerment of Ansar Allah.
The views expressed in Q&As are those of the interviewees and do not necessarily reflect the position of the Centre.
Dr. Moussaoui, your new book looks at state formation in Iran, and how it has been intertwined with security ambitions. Could you please give us a brief overview of what Iran’s approach to securing its interests in the region has been since the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran following the 1979 revolution?
There are two decisive periods in the formation of the Islamic Republic of Iran. The first was the Iranian Revolution and the rise to power of Ayatollah Khomeini in 1979, at the age of 77. He arrived with a messianic vision of an Islamic state governed under "Wilayet e-Faqih”, also known as the Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist, a political ideology in Shia Islam that posits that the Muslim community should be led by a qualified Islamic cleric. His aim was to transfer this state ideology and model to the region and neighbouring countries. To justify its policy of expansion, Iran’s approach was to challenge the United States, which after the fall of the Shah came to be framed as a powerful enemy that needed to be defeated. Following the evolution of these dynamics, the Iran-Iraq War eventually broke out in 1980, lasting eight years.
The second period began after the Iran-Iraq War, with the transformation of Iranian defence doctrine and its objectives. The policy of exporting the Iranian revolution model was unofficially abandoned and gradually replaced by a security and defence strategy that sought to expand Iranian influence in the region for defence purposes. Following the 2003 War in Iraq, this organically evolved into a policy of establishing the creation of militias as a means to protect Iran’s national security, something which had never been intentionally planned. What I define in detail in the book is a projection of military power throughout the Middle East region. The approach has been to continue designating the United States as an enemy to be challenged and pushed out of the region with both ideological tools on one hand and strategic pragmatism on the other.
So it seems that Iran’s power projection in the region has been deeply anchored in and driven by the Islamic Republic’s religious ideology. Is that what you argue in the book?
What we see as ideology in our understanding of Iran is for the regime in Tehran a policy at the service of the Muslim Ummah, the global Islamic community. We must not neglect the value of this narrative and its intentions. This projection of power, although militarily very visible through the “Axis of Resistance”, has also aimed to create a popular base beyond Iran’s borders, which is not confined to members of the Shia faith. The religious policies employed by Tehran have made it possible for the regime to constitute narratives in accordance with objectives specific to its messianic message, responding to very specific contexts.
What role have armed groups played in shaping Iran’s regional power, both as proxies and threats?
The regime in Tehran sees proxies as tools of war to be activated, if necessary, in Iran's grand military strategy, according to its doctrine of sacred defence. This doctrine was developed specifically for its national security, not only for political expansion, but above all to broaden its influence among the region's populations – to establish parallel economic markets and circumvent Western sanctions. Today, Iran’s leaders remain fully aware that they cannot export Iran’s state model, so their priority is to protect this state model at home and address the difficulties in its economic market partly through regional expansion.
“The regime in Tehran sees proxies as tools of war ”
What have been the main impacts of the war in Gaza on Iran’s regional role and its interest? And how has this shaped its ability to respond to Israel’s attacks on 13 June 2025?
The war in Gaza has changed the distribution of power in the region, largely diminishing Iranian influence. Today, the “Axis of Resistance” has lost its coordination capability and become weak because a central node in the network has been heavily damaged. The Axis has been based on and built around the structure of Hezbollah and its leader Hassan Nasrallah, who acted as the main coordinator at operational level, translating the orders from the strategic level – the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) chain of command – to Iran’s various militias and armed groups partners at the tactical level.
Hezbollah’s weakening was compounded by developments in Syria, which today represents the beating heart of the shaping of the new Middle East. The Syrian civil war between 2011 and 2024 revealed Iran's ability to recruit, maintain, and transfer military know-how to its proxies and partners. It showed how Tehran shaped the geopolitical balance of power in the region by placing pawns in the region to delay an offensive such as the one they are experiencing today. But with Assad’s fall, Tehran lost yet another pawn. First Hamas, then Hezbollah, and then Assad.
It is important to add that according to my academic research and to realist theory, the Islamic Republic of Iran should be understood as a weak state, and its regime as being obsolete. Nevertheless, the regime appears to be very resilient, as demonstrated in its current confrontation with Israel. Although Iran does not have the same military capability as Israel and its allies, its counter-offensives have succeeded to penetrate 10 percent of the Israeli Iron Dome.
What has the war in Gaza and the current confrontation with Israel meant for Iran’s relationship with the Houthis in Yemen?
We must understand that Tehran, like other countries in the region, does not want an unstable Middle East. But let's not forget that the Iranians are strategic thinkers, and some degree of ‘controlled instability’ isn't necessarily bad for their strategic objectives. ‘Controlled instability’ creates just enough instability to open spaces for engagement, for negotiation, and for influence. The Iran-Houthi relationship has remained strong despite the war, but more importantly, it has allowed Ansar Allah to restore its image among the regional and global Muslim community, to consolidate its power among the population in northern Yemen, and to gain legitimacy through its support for Gaza. We can’t forget that both the Yemeni population and most of the Arab populations are pro-Palestinian.
Ultimately, the Houthis are continuing their project to establish a legitimate and functioning state in the North of Yemen and managing their narrative in accordance with the geopolitical context, taking advantage of the different opportunities that arise. They will rally to defend Iran because it's in their interest, it is part of their internal and external strategy. I think they realise that this means they could be next on the list of targets.
In what ways could the Iran-Houthi relationship be affected by the recently announced US-Houthi ceasefire, the current Iran-Israel conflict, and US-Iran negotiations on Iran’s nuclear programme?
I don't think that the ceasefire or US-Iran negotiations on the nuclear programme affects relations between Sanaa and Tehran. Ansar Allah has already proven itself as an “armed force” capable of managing clashes, and it has remained resilient despite attacks on its territory by the US and its allies.
In fact, resilience remains a powerful and common refrain between Iran’s and Ansar Allah’s political and regional doctrines. I think what Tehran has managed to achieve is not just the transfer of military know-how to its partners, like Ansar Allah, but also this ability to find resilience in their actions, and ways of fighting for their ideas. It seems abstract to us and doesn't speak to the way we see the world, but for them it makes sense.
